Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc.: The Knowledge Standard for Contributory Copyright Infringement and the Fair Use Doctrine by Burcher, Eugene A. & Hughes, Anna M.
Richmond Journal of Law and Technology
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 7
1997
Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line
Communications Services, Inc.: The Knowledge
Standard for Contributory Copyright Infringement
and the Fair Use Doctrine
Eugene A. Burcher
burceuge@uofrlaw.urich.edu
Anna M. Hughes
University of Richmond, hughanna@uofrlaw.urich.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Internet Law Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Richmond
Journal of Law and Technology by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
scholarshiprepository@richmond.edu.
Recommended Citation
Eugene A. Burcher & Anna M. Hughes, Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc.: The Knowledge
Standard for Contributory Copyright Infringement and the Fair Use Doctrine, 3 Rich. J.L. & Tech 5 (1997).
Available at: http://scholarship.richmond.edu/jolt/vol3/iss1/7
 Religious Technology Center
 v.
 Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc.
Internet Service Providers: The Knowledge Standard for Contributory
Copyright Infringement and The Fair Use Defense
 
 By Eugene A. Burcher and Anna M. Hughes[*]
 
July 15, 1996
 
Cite as: Eugene A. Burcher & Anna M. Hughes, Casenote, Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcome On-Line
Communications, Inc.: Internet Service Providers: The Knowledge Standard for Contributory Copyright
Infringement and The Fair Use Defense, 3 RICH. J.L. TECH. 5 (1997)
<http://www.richmond.edu/jolt/v3i1/burhugh.html>[**].
 
 
I. Introduction 
II. The Technology
A. The Internet
B. Applications of the Internet
1. Usenet Newsgroups
2. Data and File Transfer
III. The Parties
A. Netcom, Klemswsrud and Erlich
B. The Church of Scientology
1. L. Ron Hubbard and the Religious Technology Center
2. Controversy on the Internet - alt.scientology.religion
IV. The Applicable Law
A. The Direct Infringement Requirement
B. The Knowledge Standard
C. Substantial Participation Requirement
D. Fair Use Defense
V.  Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
A. Facts
B. The Decision
1. No Direct Infringement or Vicarious Liability
2. Material Issue of Fact on Knowledge Element of Contributory Infringement
3. Substantial Participation Requirement
4. Fair Use
C. Implications of Judge Whyte's Decision
VI. Analysis
A. Actual Knowledge, Constructive Knowledge or No Knowledge
B. When Should Knowledge Be Measured?
C. What Is the Effect of the Letter?
D. Capabilities of the BBS or ISP
E. Substantial Participation
F. Fair Use
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
4. The Effect on the Potential Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work
G. The Magnifying Effect of Harm by the Internet
VII. Conclusion
 
 I. Introduction
{1} With 30 million people connected worldwide and the ability to rapidly transfer large amounts of data, the
Internet[1] poses a great threat to owners of intellectual property.[2] The Internet's rapid growth has led to
substantial speculation about how courts will apply intellectual property law concepts to conduct in
cyberspace.[3] On November 21, 1995, U.S. District Judge Ronald Whyte ruled that an Internet Service
Provider (ISP)[4] could be liable for contributory copyright infringement when a subscribing member
directly infringes a copyright.[5]
{2} This case began on February 13, 1995, when armed police officers and attorneys from the Church of
Scientology (the Church) raided the home of Dennis Erlich (Erlich), a former minister of the Church.[6]
Erlich was charged with copyright infringement of the Church's sacred writings. In addition to its civil action
against Erlich, the Church also sued Netcom On-Line Communication Services, Inc. (Netcom), the ISP for
the Bulletin Board System (BBS) containing the alleged infringing postings, and Tom Klemesrud, the
operator of the BBS which Erlich used to transmit his postings. Judge Whyte issued a temporary restraining
order against Erlich, Klemesrud, and Netcom in February 1995, ordering them to stop posting the infringing
material. At the time of publication of this paper, both Netcom and Klemesrud have settled out of court with
RTC; Erlich still remains a defendant.[7]
{3} In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom On-Line Communications Services, Inc., Judge Whyte held
that Netcom could be liable if they knew or should have known of the infringing activity.[8] This application
of copyright law to cyberspace has already begun to set the standard for future conflicts.[9] It also has helped
to define the preventative steps necessary for ISP industry members to take so that they may avoid liability
for infringing activity of their subscribers.[10] These steps hinge on the ISP's knowledge of an infringer's
activities.[11]
{4} Judge Whyte rejected the charges of direct infringement and vicarious liability against the defendant ISP.
[12] He stated that a material issue of fact existed as to the ISP's knowledge of the infringing activity,[13] and
a material issue existed as to whether the ISP was entitled to a fair use defense.[14] The scope of this paper is
limited to the doctrine of contributory copyright infringement as applied to an ISP -- the knowledge required
of the subscriber's infringing activity and the affirmative defense to contributory infringement: the fair use
doctrine.[15] In conclusion, the paper shows that constructive knowledge is all that is necessary to hold an
ISP liable for infringing activity and that the success of a fair use defense will hinge upon the potential harm
to the material's market.
{5} Before analyzing the case's specific issues, it is necessary to understand the background of the technology
used to transmit postings over the Internet as well as some basic information about the parties.
 
 
II. The Technology
A. The Internet
{6} The Internet is a global system of networks that uses a common communications standard to link
together the different computer networks and systems of individuals, universities and government agencies.
[16] The Internet's networks are connected through the use of fiber optic links, regular phone lines, or high
speed dedicated leased lines.[17] "Policies [and standards] regulating the Internet are made by the Internet
Society Operating Committee," a voluntary membership organization dedicated to the promotion of
networking technologies.[18] There are currently over 30 million users worldwide accessing the Internet, and
the number is doubling yearly.[19]
{7} The Internet offers a wide range of applications, including: electronic mail (e-mail); Usenet groups; the
World Wide Web; databases and public domain software; and data and file transfer.[20] Several of these
applications, important to the understanding of this case, are discussed in the following sections.
B. Applications of the Internet
1. Usenet Newsgroups
{8} Usenet is a network of thousands of computers connected to the Internet that provides forums, referred to
as newsgroups, "which allow users to exchange information on a variety of topics of shared interest."[21] A
newsgroup is the simple way in which Usenet groups are categorized according to various areas of interest.
[22] Internet users can search the various topics or provide their own knowledge on diverse subjects ranging
from restaurants to horseback riding to sexual fetishes.[23] Within a matter of hours, an individual Usenet
posting is distributed all over the world.[24] Many thousands of Internet users are Usenet participants.
2. Data and File Transfer
{9} The Internet can be used to transfer computer files such as programs, text or data from one computer to
another.[25] For example, text can be moved from a newsgroup to a word processing file on the user's
personal computer. Parties are then able to work more easily on common files even while physically
separated by great distance. Information transferred over the Internet is in digital format, eliminating the need
of the receiving party to retype the information.[26] Instead, the information may be further manipulated and
even sent on to other Internet users.[27] 
 
 
III. The Parties
A. Netcom, Klemesrud, and Erlich
{10} Netcom is an Internet service provider.[28] As an ISP, Netcom is paid a fee by subscribers to gain
access to the Internet.[29] If the subscriber has a computer with a modem and a phone line, he or she can
access the Internet and all of its resources.[30]
{11} Many bulletin board services (BBS's) are accessible through Usenet,[31] which functions as a world-
wide distribution chain.[32] As a Usenet participant, Netcom provides its subscribers with Usenet access.[33]
"Postings on a particular BBS can be accessed from any computer in the Internet through Usenet, if that BBS
is a Usenet participant."[34]
{12} As an Internet service provider, Netcom does not determine the "content of the information available on
the Internet" and consequently, does not control the information which may be accessed by its subscribers.
[35] Service providers, such as America Online and CompuServe may offer limited access to the Internet,
providing a specific menu, including value added services, limited Internet access and e-mail.[36] Instead of
offering content-based services, Netcom is merely a conduit to the Internet and all the information available
therein.[37]
{13} Tom Klemesrud, one of the defendants in this case, is a Netcom subscriber.[38] Klemesrud operates a
BBS on Netcom. Through his BBS, Klemesrud can access over 900 newsgroups.[39] His subscribers can
access these newsgroups and use them to post messages to the Usenet.[40] Additionally, individual
subscribers are able to use the Internet through Klemesrud's connection which he maintains through Netcom.
[41] Dennis Erlich is a subscriber to Klemesrud's Bulletin Board.[42] He is able to "dial-up" the computer
that Klemesrud operates, and through that computer, he can post messages to the newsgroups on Usenet.[43]
Information which is posted to a Usenet newsgroup is transferred to everyone on Usenet, no matter where the
posting or message originated.[44]
B. The Church of Scientology
1. L. Ron Hubbard and the Religious Technology Center
{14} L. Ron Hubbard was a science fiction writer and founded the Church of Scientology. "His published
books, monographs, internal-policy documents, and taped lectures form what the Church calls its sacred
scriptures."[45] The Church's texts, which are used in the higher levels of the religion's training, are guarded
very carefully. Many critics of the Church say that in reality, it is a "hugely profitable global racket that
survives by intimidating members and critics in a Mafia-like manner."[46] The legal actions taken by the
Church against numerous defendants nearly always focus on protecting the texts and scriptures from
distribution and disclosure on the Internet.[47] The Religious Technology Center (RTC) owns a number of
copyrights for these works and has filed many of the Internet-related legal actions. Some courts have
indicated that RTC uses legal action in an attempt to restrict criticism of the Church.[48] RTC has stated that
it is only protecting its copyrighted works from abuse and exploitation.
2. Controversy on the Internet - alt.religion.scientology
{15} Scott Goehring created the newsgroup "alt.religion.scientology" (a.r.s.) on July 17, 1991. He states that
he created it as a joke and as a way for the Usenet to "disseminate the truth about this half-assed religion."
[49] The newsgroup was never a quiet one, attracting both believers and skeptics.[50]
{16} The newsgroup was altered significantly by the presence of Dennis Erlich. Erlich had and still has very
strong views against the Church of Scientology and its methods. He was unlikely to develop an amicable
relationship with the Scientologists on the newsgroup. Erlich's postings often incited controversy.
Consequently, "his critical posts, with quotations from the Church literature, turned a.r.s from a debating club
into a battlefield."[51] 
 
 
IV. The Applicable Law
{17} Copyright infringement is statutorily defined. In general, it is a violation of an exclusive right granted
by the Copyright Act.[52] The concept of contributory copyright infringement is a judicially created legal
doctrine.[53] It is designed to give a cause of action to a copyright owner against a third-party "who, with
knowledge of the infringing activity, induces, causes, or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of
another."[54] This third party may then be held liable as a "contributory infringer."[55] The concept's basis
lies in tort theory.[56]
A. The Direct Infringement Requirement
{18} Before one can be held liable for contributory copyright infringement, another must have committed
direct copyright infringement.[57] It is clear, however, that this direct infringer need not be a party to the suit;
nor is a finding of direct infringement required before one can be liable for contributory copyright
infringement.[58]
B. The Knowledge Standard
{19} Knowledge of the infringing activity is required for a finding of contributory copyright infringement.
[59] This knowledge of the infringing activity can be actual or constructive.[60] "A person possessing
information that objectively indicates the existence of direct infringement may be considered to have
constructive knowledge of the infringement even if he is actually unaware of the infringement."[61] The
knowledge requirement is met by showing either what the accused infringer actually knew or what he should
have known.[62] This is a higher standard than is required by direct copyright infringement[63] or by the
patent law doctrine of contributory infringement.[64]
C. Substantial Participation Requirement
{20} Inducing, causing or materially contributing to the infringing activity creates the element of substantial
participation required for contributory infringement.[65] The participation element and the knowledge
element are directly interrelated.[66] "The closer the defendant's [participation is] to the directly infringing
activity, the stronger the inference will be that the defendant knew of the activity."[67]
D. Fair Use Defense
{21} An affirmative defense to contributory copyright infringement is the fair use doctrine. Statutory factors
of the fair use doctrine include: (1) purpose and character of use; (2) nature of copyrighted work; (3) amount
and substantiality of portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) effect of use on the
potential market for or value of copyrighted work.[68]
{22} "From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of copyrighted materials has
been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts.'"[69] The fair use doctrine is based on factual determinations of each case individually; there are no
"bright line rules," only the guidance provided by statutes and cases, which are not exhaustive of all possible
fair uses.[70] The Supreme Court has held in fair use cases that the purpose of the copyright protection is the
main consideration and that the "underlying policy of promoting the development of new works" must also
be considered.[71] Reproduction of a copyrighted work which is used to promote "criticism, comment, news
reporting, teaching, scholarship or research" will be found to be a fair use, and thus, not a copyright
infringement.[72]
{23} The purpose of the statute outlining the fair use of a work is to foster the author's creativity; therefore,
the copyright statute is not strictly applied in all cases.[73] All of the statutorily defined factors are to be
explored together --not in isolation-- given the purpose and goals of copyright laws.[74] 
 
 
V. Religious Technology Center v. Netcom
A. Facts
{24} In Religious Technology Center v. Netcom,[75] the District Court for the Northern District of California
addressed the issue of the liability of an ISP (Netcom) and a BBS operator (Klemesrud) for the infringing
activity of a subscriber (Erlich) to their services. The court used the following facts as the basis for its
decision.
{25} Erlich is an expelled minister of the Church of Scientology. RTC is the owner of copyrights for some of
L. Ron Hubbard's published and unpublished works; some of which are considered religious documents by
the Church.[76] In its complaint, RTC states that Hubbard died in 1986 and that he was a philosopher who
wrote about "applied religious philosophy and spiritual healing technology."[77] The writings formed the
basis of the Church of Scientology's theology and the training manuals used to help members rise through the
Church.[78] Hubbard is the author of the famous Scientology text called: Dianetics: The Modern Science of
Mental Health.[79] Additionally, there is a special group of works, often called the "Advanced Technology
materials," which the Church considers to be confidential and to contain "proprietary information constituting
trade secrets."[80]
{26} In order to criticize the Church, Erlich posted some of these works to alt.religion.scientology.[81] To
post his messages, Erlich subscribed to the BBS owned and operated by Klemesrud. Klemesrud used Netcom
as the ISP for his BBS. Messages posted by Erlich remained on Klemesrud's BBS for 3 days and on Netcom's
system for 11 days.[82] After those respective time periods, the messages were automatically removed. RTC
first tried to stop the infringing activity by notifying Erlich that his actions were illegal. When this did not
stop Erlich's postings, RTC contacted both Klemesrud and Netcom, notifying them of Erlich's illegal activity
and requesting Erlich be denied access to their systems.[83] This notice was received by Netcom on the 10th
day of the 11 day cycle for the infringing messages.[84]
{27} Instead of complying with RTC's demands, Klemesrud requested RTC prove copyright ownership to the
disputed works.[85] Netcom took no action and did not look at the messages to determine the validity of the
plaintiff's claim.[86] The result was that Erlich's postings remained on the BBS and available via the Internet
for some period of time after Klemesrud and Netcom had received notice from the plaintiffs of the potential
infringement.
{28} In his decision, Judge Whyte denied a motion for summary judgement by Netcom and a motion for
judgment on the pleadings by Klemesrud.[87] He also denied a preliminary injunction requested by RTC
against Netcom and Klemesrud.[88] In a separate ruling entered September 22, 1995, the District court
granted RTC a preliminary injunction against Erlich for his infringing activity of posting these copyrighted
works to the Internet.[89]
B. The Decision
1. No Direct Infringement or Vicarious Liability
{29} Judge Whyte refused to hold Netcom or Klemesrud directly liable for copyright infringement.[90]
Because neither Netcom nor Klemesrud initiated the copying done by Erlich, Judge Whyte concluded "the
mere fact that Netcom's system incidentally makes temporary copies of plaintiff's works does not mean
Netcom has caused the copying."[91] Comparing Netcom's system to that of a public copying machine, Judge
Whyte rejected the application of the strict liability standard for direct infringement and held that
contributory infringement was more appropriate for machine owners such as Netcom and Klemesrud.[92]
{30} The strict liability standard as applied in Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena [93] was also rejected by
Judge Whyte.[94] The court held that "the storage on a defendant's system of infringing copies and
retransmission to other servers [was] not a direct infringement by the BBS operator of the exclusive right to
reproduce the work where such copies [were] uploaded by an infringing user."[95]
{31} Finally, Judge Whyte rejected application of direct infringement for public distribution and display of
the copyrighted works.[96] Netcom did not "create or control the content of the information available to its
subscribers."[97] "There [was] no logical reason to draw a line around Netcom and Klemesrud and say that
they [were] uniquely responsible for distributing Erlich's messages."[98] Netcom was not even the first link,
[99] and there were many other ways to access the Internet.[100] "Where the BBS merely stores and passes
along all messages sent by its subscribers and others, the BBS should not be seen as causing these works to
be publicly distributed or displayed."[101] Whyte also stated that "mere possession of a digital copy on a
BBS that is accessible to some members of the public" may not constitute direct infringement of the
exclusive right to publicly distribute and display.[102] The court concluded that no purpose would be served
by applying a direct infringement analysis.[103]
{32} Judge Whyte also refused to hold Netcom or Klemesrud vicariously liable for copyright infringement.
[104] Although there was a material issue of fact for the first element of vicarious liability, the court rejected
the second element.[105] It was plausible that Netcom had the right and ability to control Erlich's message,
but the court found that Netcom did not derive direct financial benefit from the infringing activity of its users.
[106]
2. Material Issue of Fact on Knowledge Element of Contributory Infringement
{33} Although the court rejected both direct infringement liability and vicarious liability, it refused to rule in
either party's favor on the issue of contributory infringement. Judge Whyte stated that there was a material
issue of fact as to the knowledge element of the alleged contributory copyright infringement by Netcom and
Klemesrud.[107] "Because Netcom was arguably participating in Erlich's public distribution of plaintiff's
works, there [was] a genuine issue as to whether Netcom [and Klemesrud] knew of any infringement by
Erlich before it was too late to do anything about it."[108] If the plaintiffs could prove the knowledge
element, Netcom could be liable because it did not cancel the infringing activity and stop the infringing
material from being distributed worldwide, with its failure to act constituting substantial participation.[109]
{34} Netcom presented four arguments to rebut the knowledge element;[110] however, none of these were
sufficient to persuade Judge Whyte that no material issue of fact existed. The arguments were: "(1) [Netcom]
did not know of Erlich's planned infringing activities when it agreed to lease its facilities to Klemesrud; (2)
[Netcom] did not know that Erlich would infringe prior to any of its postings; (3) [Netcom] is unable to
screen out infringing postings before they are made; and (4) [Netcom's] knowledge . . . was too equivocal
given the difficulty in assessing" the validity of RTC's claims and the question of whether Erlich's conduct
fell under the fair use defense.[111]
{35} Judge Whyte rejected arguments (1) through (3) by showing that Netcom had some control over the
messages on its system and questioning whether they could have done something about Erlich's activities.
[112] Citing Deutsch v. Arnold,[113] Netcom likened itself to the lessor of a premises.[114] The court
rejected the argument that the measuring of whether there was knowledge should be made at the time of the
signing of the lease.[115] Because Netcom maintained control over the use of its system, unlike a lessor-
lessee relationship, the court concluded that the knowledge element should be measured when "Netcom
provided its services to allow Erlich to infringe plaintiff's copyrights."[116]
{36} The court stated that Netcom could not have knowledge of the infringing activity before receipt of the
letter notifying them of Erlich's activity.[117] The court went on to say that there is a question of fact as to
whether Netcom knew or should have known that Erlich had infringed plaintiff's copyrights following receipt
of the plaintiff's letter and before it was too late to do anything about it.[118]
{37} For two reasons, the court also rejected Netcom's fourth argument, that its knowledge was too equivocal
after the notice.[119] Netcom argued its position by showing the difficulty of assessing the validity of the
Church's registrations and balancing that with Erlich's possible fair use.[120] First, this was rejected because
the works contained copyright notices.[121] Second, it was rejected because of the burden this would put on
a copyright owner to prevent the infringing activity.[122]
{38} The court was more sympathetic to the argument that it was difficult for a BBS operator to quickly and
fairly determine the existence of a fair use when there is at least a colorable claim of fair use.[123] Its
conclusion was that if
[a] BBS operator cannot reasonably verify a claim of infringement, either because of a possible
fair use defense, the lack of copyright notices on the copies, or the copyright holder's failure to
provide the necessary documentation to show that there is a likely infringement, the operator's
lack of knowledge will be found reasonable and there will be no liability for contributory
infringement for allowing the continued distribution of the works on its system.[124]
Because the plaintiffs notified Netcom of Erlich's activities, the court concluded there was an issue of fact as
to Netcom's knowledge.[125] Additionally, Netcom admitted it had not even looked at the messages, and had
it done so, it would have investigated them further for infringement.[126]
3. Substantial Participation Requirement
{39} The interrelationship between knowledge and participation is essential to a finding of contributory
infringement.[127] Comparing this case to Fonsovia, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc.,[128] the court found that
Netcom was more than a mere lessor of a premises on which infringing activity took place.[129] Because
Netcom did not completely relinquish control over how its system was used, it would have been able to take
simple measures to prevent further damage to the plaintiffs, assuming knowledge of the infringing activity.
[130] Therefore, combining the participation element and the knowledge element,[131] the court concluded
that there was a material issue of fact existed as to the plaintiff's theory of contributory infringement after
Netcom was on notice.[132]
4. Fair Use
{40} The court held that there was a material issue of fact as to whether Netcom's actions constituted a valid
fair use under section 107 of the Copyright Act.[133] By using the factors which section 107 takes into
account for the fair use defense, the court conducted an equitable balancing test to come to its conclusion.
[134] Although Netcom had the ability to prevent further distribution of the works and the plaintiffs had not
given permission for the viewing or copying of their works, there was no evidence that the use would
significantly harm the market for the original. [135]
C. Implications of Judge Whyte's Decision
{41} The court denied RTC's request for a preliminary injunction against Netcom and Klemesrud. Because
there was "little evidence that Netcom or Klemesrud knew or should have known that Erlich was engaged in
copyright infringement" and that Erlich was not entitled to a fair use defense, RTC failed to meet their burden
of showing a likelihood of success on the merits.[136] RTC failed to show that the preliminary injunction
currently in effect was insufficient to avoid any harm to its property rights.[137] The preliminary injunction
request was also overly broad, having a potentially chilling effect on free speech on either Netcom's or
Klemesrud's systems.[138]
 
VI. Analysis
{42} The court stated that Netcom and Klemesrud could be found liable for contributory infringement if the
plaintiffs could prove the knowledge element.[139] The concept of contributory copyright infringement
knowledge has not been applied in the context of a BBS or an ISP.[140] However, in predicting the
application of the doctrine of contributory infringement to operators of BBS's, a number of commentators
have discussed the knowledge requirement.[141] An analysis of the knowledge sufficient to hold an ISP
liable for contributory infringement will be discussed. First, the types of knowledge will be explored,
followed by an integration of the capabilities of the ISP and the substantial participation element with the
knowledge requirement. Throughout this analysis, a comparison of contributory copyright infringement cases
will show how courts have applied this doctrine to similar fact patterns. Finally, the court's consideration of
the fair use defense will be analyzed.
A. Actual Knowledge, Constructive Knowledge or No Knowledge
{43} Some commentators have discussed in great detail the application of actual versus constructive
knowledge to contributory copyright infringement.[142] It is clear that if an ISP has actual knowledge that
infringing activity is taking place on its system, it must take action to avoid contributory infringement
liability.[143] However, "[c]onstructive knowledge can be imputed to a party if the circumstances
surrounding the activity should have indicated to the defendant that the activity was illegal."[144] One
commentator has concluded that the knowledge standard for BBS operators should be that of negligence and
the knowledge of a reasonable person.[145]
{44} This measurement is different than the standard established for the tort of defamation as previously
applied to BBS operators.[146] In Cubby Inc. v. CompuServe Inc.,[147] the Second Circuit dealt with the
issue of a BBS operator's liability for a defamatory statement in an article posted on one of its forums.
Holding that the BBS was liable only if it "knew or had reason to know" about the defamatory statements and
took no action, the court limited the standard of knowledge to actual knowledge.[148] Recognition of the
special nature of the BBS and its ability to allow users to access material from around the world factored into
the court's analysis.[149] Also, the court felt that the BBS was more like a "distributor" than a publisher and
thus lowered the knowledge standard.[150] Another court that has dealt with this issue held that a BBS
operator was a publisher because it used software to automatically pre-screen messages that were in bad taste
or offensive.[151] Treating a BBS operator as a "publisher" is a lower threshold for the knowledge
requirement; it changes the level of knowledge to a strict liability standard.[152] What appears to be common
in both of these analyses is the capabilities that a BBS has in controlling its system.[153] If a BBS can easily
detect illegal messages and prevent them from being transmitted to the Internet, the BBS might be treated as
a publisher. In most cases it is impractical to monitor every message. Thus, a BBS operator could be treated
as a distributor.
{45} The court rejected the strict liability standard of no knowledge in its refusal to hold Netcom liable for
direct copyright infringement.[154] The court relied on several sources to come to its conclusion.[155] First,
it distinguished Netcom from the machine operator in MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc.[156] In
MAI, a machine operator uploaded a copyrighted computer software program into the RAM of the
defendant's computer.[157] The court in MAI concluded that this action was sufficient for the uploading to be
considered a copy under the Copyright Act.[158] Judge Whyte distinguished Netcom from MAI because the
ISP was a passive participant in Erlich's illegal activity.[159] Netcom was only a conduit for Erlich's activity,
much like a photocopier owner.[160] Therefore, the court felt that Netcom should be subject to liability only
under the contributory infringement theory.[161]
{46} The court also distinguished the case from Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena[162] and Sega
Enterprises Ltd. v. MAPHIA,[163] two cases addressing "the liability of BBS operators for infringing files
uploaded by subscribers."[164] It is important to note that without regard to knowledge, the court could not
distinguish what Netcom did from what any other Usenet server did in copying the messages.[165] Holding
Netcom liable for direct infringement was too broad because all Usenet servers could then be held liable for
Erlich's infringing activity.[166] Thus the court concluded that Netcom could not be held liable for direct
infringement. In other words, Netcom could not be liable without knowledge of the infringing acts.[167]
B. When Should Knowledge Be Measured?
{47} The court rebuffed Netcom's theory that knowledge should be measured at the time of signing the lease.
[168] Because Netcom still maintained control over its system, the court rejected the comparison of Netcom
with that of a lessor of property (as in Deutsch v. Arnold).[169] The court concluded that measurement of
whether Netcom knew of the infringing activity should begin at the point that Netcom received notice of the
infringing activity by RTC.[170] The court also stated that the Church's works were marked with copyright
notices, but did not further discuss whether this by itself constituted knowledge.[171] The mere existence of a
copyright mark is probably not sufficient to constitute knowledge. One author writes "[N]otice of copyright,
whatever its practical value may be, has virtually no legal significance."[172]
{48} It seems plausible that a telephone call warning of the infringing activity would be sufficient knowledge
if knowledge begins upon receipt of notice. However, the court blends a number of factors that make the
standard of knowledge a tougher question.[173] An industry group known as the Computer Information
Exchange (CIX)[174] filed an amicus curie brief in Religious Technology Center v. Lerma.[175]
{49} The brief supports a high standard of knowledge, arguing that ISP's are in a poor position to determine
the validity of a copyright infringement claim.[176] Many Usenet groups are used as a verbal discussion
forum.[177] Requiring an ISP to remove allegedly infringing material makes it susceptible to many frivolous
infringement claims by parties who find the material on the Usenet group offensive, undesirable or contrary
to their views.[178] The brief argues that this places the ISP in a "Catch-22" position; either they remove all
of the messages, or subject themselves to copyright infringement liability.[179] Also, the ease of determining
the validity of a copyright depends on the material itself.[180] This raises the following question.
C. What Is the Effect of the Letter?
{50} The court is clear that there must be more than just a notification of infringement from a copyright
owner to meet the knowledge element.[181] How much more knowledge is the pivotal question: is a duty
placed on the BBS operator to investigate every notification of infringement? One commentator analyzed the
possibility of a duty requirement and concluded that one might exist depending on the amount of knowledge.
[182] An Information Infrastructure Task Force (IITF) "White Paper"[183] has taken the position that it is
premature to reduce ISP liability for copyright infringement by a subscriber. After a long discussion, the IITF
"White Paper" concludes that an ISP should be treated as a publisher - therefore demanding a strict liability
standard. It takes this position because of the difficulty imposed upon a copyright owner in enforcing the
rights to which he or she is entitled.[184] In contrast, the court rejected the direct infringement liability as a
remedy to this issue.[185] In this light, it is useful to compare notification in the copyright context to that of
patents, which has a statutorily created contributory infringement law.[186]
{51} In patent law, where courts require actual knowledge to find contributory infringement,[187] the
concept of notification of infringement is well developed. Recently, a member of the patent bar detailed
notification from the viewpoint of a plaintiff's attorney.[188] What can be gained from this comparison is that
there are remedies for false infringement claims and there are duties imposed upon the receipt of such
notification.[189] Comparing this to copyrights, the question becomes what quantity of information in the
notification imposes a duty on the ISP to take steps toward removal of the infringing message. It would
appear the court feels that RTC did not give enough information to impose a duty.[190] Therefore, a
reasonable person standard is proposed to constitute knowledge of the infringing activity - requiring enough
information for the ISP to make a determination under a reasonable person standard that there is infringement
would suffice. If the ISP failed to take action sufficient to prevent the infringement from continuing, it would
be liable for contributory infringement. However, the question remains as to what an ISP has the capability to
do in such circumstances.[191]
D. Capabilities of the BBS or ISP
{52} Netcom and Klemesrud are incapable of monitoring all of the data passing through their systems.[192]
Arguably, if they were able to detect the copyright symbol in the data, then they would have had knowledge
that copyrighted material was being transmitted through their systems. However, as the court states, this
probably would be insufficient to constitute knowledge of the infringing activity.[193] Copyrighted material
is transmitted through the Internet frequently.[194] In order to perform the research necessary for this paper,
copyrighted material was transmitted through the Internet - legally. In order to distinguish material legally
transmitted and material illegally transmitted, something more than a copyright symbol is required. For
example, the copyright symbol, combined with the letter sent by RTC, could be sufficient for a reasonable
person to conclude that infringing activity was occurring, depending on the content of the notice.
{53} Perhaps the capabilities of the BBS should be taken into account to evaluate whether the knowledge of
the infringing activity rises to the level necessary for contributory infringement. If an operator routinely
screens information flowing through her system and is able to detect copyrighted material, then it is
reasonable that, after sufficient notification of infringement, the ISP should remove the message. In its
rebuttal to the IITF "White Paper," the ISP industry supports this position.[195] However, the question
remains whether the operator has the capability to remove a message and the effects of such action on the
alleged infringer.[196]
E. Substantial Participation
{54} Finally, the court conducted a cursory inquiry into the element of substantial participation.[197] It
concluded that RTC raised a material issue of fact as to whether Netcom substantially participated in the
infringement for two reasons. First, Netcom left the message on its system for some time after it was notified
of the infringement. Second, this message was available worldwide through the Internet.[198] Substantial
participation is generally viewed in the context of all of the alleged infringer's actions. In Sega, the defendant
was found to have substantially participated when he solicited buyers for machines on which the infringing
copies were made.[199] He also provided methods for sales to be conducted through his BBS and derived
direct financial benefit from these transactions.[200]
{55} The court's analysis demonstrates the interrelationship between knowledge and substantial participation.
At one point, the court does not yield to Netcom's argument that the ISP is a mere conduit for Erlich's
activity;[201] however, the court states that it is unlikely that Netcom's participation was substantial.[202]
Some commentators and the industry's amicus curiae have referred to an ISP as being a passive part of the
process; that they are mere conduits like the telephone company.[203] Although this element is not the focus
of this paper, it does provide a basis upon which this case might be decided.
F. Fair Use
{56} The fair use defense says that members of the public may use the work without violating the copyright
laws. The four factors which are considered by the court in determining whether the use of a copyrighted
work is acceptable under the fair use defense are discussed below.
1. The Purpose and Character of the Use
{57} The court found that Netcom's use of the words was "clearly commercial."[204] However, the court
cited the finding in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., that "a commercial use does not dictate against a
finding of fair use, as most of the uses listed in the statute are 'generally conducted for profit in this country.'"
[205] Any financial incentive gained by Netcom is unrelated to the specific copyright infringing posting.
{58} Netcom, as a conduit to the Internet, does not use or benefit from the postings sent by users and
subscribers.[206] Netcom simply provides the means for access to the Internet.
{59} Rick Francis argues that Erlich does not subscribe directly to Netcom, but instead uses it through a
bulletin board containing many other users. As a result, for Netcom to completely stop Erlich from posting,
they would have to eliminate Klemesrud's entire bulletin board, terminating access for all its subscribers in
the process.[207]
{60} Netcom enables its subscribers to connect to the Internet and access its various resources. The
maintenance and operations of the numerous Internet applications are not serviced by Netcom. Netcom
maintains a newsgroup for its subscribers, but the newsgroup is largely unmonitored and people are free to
communicate with one another.[208] Because of the manner in which Netcom functions, it is unable to view
the content of any message being posted to the Internet before it is distributed. Also, Netcom has declined to
edit messages posted to the Internet by its subscribers.[209]
{61} "It is undisputed that . . . Netcom does not directly gain anything from the content of the information
available to its subscribers on the Internet."[210] Consequently, since Netcom's interest in the copyrighted
material is the same as with any other posting on its server, the court found this fact weighed in favor of
Netcom. Netcom's purpose is the same whether or not the posting violates a copyright.
2. The Nature of the Copyrighted Work
{62} The nature of the work includes considerations of whether or not the material which is used is
"published or unpublished and whether the work is informative or creative."[211] The court found that since
Netcom's use of the works was "merely to facilitate their posting to the Usenet, which is an entirely different
purpose than [RTC's or even Erlich's], the precise nature of those works is not important to the fair use
determination."[212]
{63} However, an important fact that the court must consider is that some of the works posted by Erlich were
unpublished. The other statutory factors may be more important with regard to the fair use on the part of
Netcom, but the fact that some of RTC's works were unpublished, is a factor that tends to negate a finding of
fair use. If those works are unpublished and not generally available, then if someone else published those
works, the fair use defense is weakened. "Publication of an author's expression before he has authorized its
dissemination seriously infringes the author's right to decide when and whether it will be made public."[213]
3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used
{64} The third factor asks the court to consider the potentially infringing material's quality and importance, in
addition to the quantity in question.[214] A relevant issue which must be addressed is whether a substantial
amount of the work considered to be infringed upon was copied exactly from the original source.[215] Total
duplication of a copyrighted work generally weighs against a finding of fair use. A demonstration that the
copying was necessary for a noncommercial purpose can help overcome such a presumption .[216] The court
found that Netcom copied no more than necessary to serve as a Usenet server.[217] Netcom must copy all of
the files that are posted to enable their distribution. Additionally, the court has determined that prescreening
the postings for copyright infringement is not feasible.[218]
{65} To the contrary, the court found that Erlich was not entitled to fair use because of the substantial
portions of the writings which he posted to the newsgroup and the lack of additional commentary.[219]
Furthermore, Erlich violated a temporary restraining order which prohibited him from further postings which
were beyond fair use.[220] He continued to post to the newsgroup in violation of a court order. This may be
considered against him when the court is determining the fair use of the various materials.
4. The Effect on the Potential Market for or Value of the Copyrighted Work
{66} For purposes of determining fair use, a court considers the effect of the use of the copyrighted work on
the potential market for it. Additionally, the value of the copyrighted work is considered. This determination
requires surveying the "extent of market harm caused by particular actions of alleged infringer and a
consideration of whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by alleged infringer
would result in substantially adverse impact on potential market for the original."[221] A court should regard
the fourth factor as the most important, even though the final analysis by the court is done by balancing the
four factors together.[222] "When a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of the entirety of an
original, it clearly supersedes the objects of the original and serves as a market replacement for it, making it
likely that cognizable market harm to the original will occur."[223]
{67} The court considered whether the Church will have a significant decline in their market for potential
recruits as a result of these postings. This can be viewed two different ways. First, the court must determine if
RTC is effected because people will not pay for the courses that are offered by the Church when users of the
Internet already have the writings which are supposed to only be available to the highest in the Church.
Second, the court must determine if these postings will cause people not to join the Church as a result of the
criticism and exposure to the nature of the practices of the Church of Scientology. The Church believes that
many of the practices can not be understood until members reach certain levels in the Church. Since they are
available on the Internet, then people may be "turned off" by certain practices because they lack knowledge
and understanding.
{68} The court decided that the effect on the potential market factor creates a genuine issue of fact which
must be considered at trial. The court seemed concerned that the widespread distribution to a potential of over
30 million people may create some harm in the market.[224] However, in this preliminary stage, RTC was
unable to bring forth any evidence which indicated that they were actually harmed in the market as a result of
these postings.[225] Additionally, the Church admits that it is currently under no threat of competition, but
states that splinter groups have attempted to form in the past.[226] Netcom indicated that no evidence was
available which indicates that any harm to the market has been sustained. The newsgroup a.r.s, by its name,
attracts persons interested either in Scientology or the criticism of it. Not every person on the Internet has
visited a.r.s. Therefore, it can not be concluded that 30 million people have seen the materials of the Church
of Scientology. Many people have never heard of Erlich or the Church. The court must find that the Netcom's
actions would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market for the writings.[227]
{69} The IITF "White Paper" has stated that commercial uses that involve no transformation of the original
and harm actual or potential markets will likely always be infringing. Nonprofit, educational, transformative
uses will often be fair.[228] Fair use involves a fact intensive analysis to determine whether use which falls
between the two extremes is fair.
G. The Magnifying Effect of Harm by the Internet
{70} The burden rests with the Church to demonstrate that the use of the works which are copyrighted will
cause harm in the market for these works.[229] In Lerma,[230] the court found that fair use defense existed
because there is no separate market for the Church of Scientology materials. Scientologists in the lower levels
and others who may happen on to the materials on the Internet are not able to understand them or use them
effectively without the supervision of the Church. Because of the specialized nature of the works, there is no
market for the writings which are in dispute without the presence of the guidance of the Church of
Scientology.[231]
{71} Therefore, even if the use of the Internet would cause for an increased market effect because of the
widespread audience, the market for these specialized articles which go hand in hand with critical training is
not diminished.
{72} However, if RTC is able to demonstrate that a harm is produced as a result of the mass distribution for
which Netcom's server is responsible, the court could decide that such use is not fair, especially with respect
to the unpublished materials. The effect of harm created by the Internet distribution has the ability to reach an
audience far greater than most other media forms. Probably the only instrument with greater effect is the
television.
 
VII. Conclusion
{74} Because this is a case of first impression of ISP liability for copyright infringement by one of its
subscribers, it will set the standard for the near future on how ISP's operate; possibly the entire Internet.
Because Klemesrud and Netcom have settled the case, the standards set by this opinion will establish the
framework for future actions of copyright infringement on the Internet. Copyright owners will be more aware
of what needs to be done to protect their rights; ISP's will know more clearly when they must act to limit the
damage caused by copyright infringement committed by one of their subscribers.
{75} Courts are unwilling to completely absolve ISP's or BBS's for copyright infringing activity by a
subscriber. The standard of knowledge required to impose liability is greater than strict liability. Constructive
knowledge of the infringing activity may be sufficient for ISP's to be liable for contributory copyright
infringement. The capabilities of the ISP, the amount of notice the ISP received and the amount the ISP
participated in the infringement will all be relevant to this determination. Possibly, a court will apply a
reasonable person standard, taking into account the above factors. Under this standard, it is probable that the
fact finder could have concluded that Netcom "knew or should have known" that Erlich's activities were
illegal.
{76} If Netcom had been found liable for contributory infringement, the success of the fair use defense could
have hinged on RTC's ability to bring forth any clear evidence which attributes a significant market harm to
Netcom's involvement in the infringement. Whether the courts will extend their interest in the protection of
the rights of copyright owners to the extent of imposing a duty on an ISP to actively monitor its system for
infringing acts is not clear. The legislature could significantly alter this standard by accepting the IITF "White
Paper" recommendation to impose a strict liability standard. However, it appears that the court in this case is
opposed to such an expansive policy.
{{END}}
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